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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of corporate acquisitions on the uncertainty faced by
acquiring firms. We use data for UK public companies from 2004 to 2017 and employ
a matching estimator combined with difference-in-differences to control for the endoge-
nous selection of firms into acquiring status. Acquisitions exert a large and persistent
effect on the volatility of stock returns of acquirers and is characterized by a pecking
order: domestic takeovers lead to a reduction in the uncertainty faced by the acquirer,
while cross-border acquisitions—particularly those involving target firms in emerging
markets—engender a positive response in acquirers’ volatility.
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1 Introduction
Corporate acquisitions are one of the largest investments that a company will ever undertake.
They also enable firms to grow much faster than internal investment would. Both their scale
and swiftness makes them a risky strategy for acquiring firms to grow. While the question
of whether acquisitions create or not value for shareholders has been studied extensively (see
e.g. Jarrell et al., 1988; Andrade et al., 2001; Betton et al., 2008, to name some of the most
prominent surveys on the topic), to the best of our knowledge, the impact that acquisitions
have on the uncertainty faced by acquiring firms has yet to be investigated.
In this paper we attempt to fill this gap in the literature. Using data for listed firms in
the UK between 2004 and 2017, we estimate the impact that the announcement of acqui-
sitions has on the uncertainty faced by acquiring firms. Following an extensive literature
in macroeconomics and finance, we use the realized volatility of acquirers’ stock returns to
measure firm-level uncertainty (see e.g. Duffee, 1995; Leahy and Whited, 1996; Bloom et al.,
2007; Grullon et al., 2012). Stock returns capture changes in investors’ perceptions about
the expected future profitability of a firm and therefore their volatility offers a readily avail-
able indicator to gauge the uncertainty perceived by financial markets about firms’ future
prospects. Furthermore, as Bloom et al. (2018) show, the volatility of stock returns is tightly
linked to shocks shaping firms’ ‘real’ performance outcomes such as total factor productivity.
Acquisitions can affect the uncertainty that financial markets perceive about a firm an-
nouncing a takeover through several channels. As we noted above, takeovers are very large
investments from the perspective of the acquirer, and while there is consensus that—on
average—they create value for shareholders, there is also ample anecdotal evidence that
they often fail dramatically.1 As the post-acquisition process unfolds and new information
1Firms buy other firms for a wide range of reasons. Acquirers might expect to increase their efficiency
by realizing economies of scale; achieve synergies by exploiting assets owned by the target firm that are not
easily replicable through internal investment; or by reallocating resources within the combined firm. They
could also intend to engage in tax or regulatory arbitrage or take advantage of short-term fluctuations in asset
prices that lead to the undervaluation of targets. Managers of acquiring firms could also simply be seeking
to increase their own compensation and prestige. There is great uncertainty surrounding the realization of
these expected benefits. Bruner (2005) offers an in-depth case-study analysis of some of the most prominent
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becomes available regarding whether the objectives of a deal have been achieved, this should
be reflected in the volatility of stock returns of acquirers. Acquisitions can also change firms’
exposure to shocks in different industries and countries. To fix ideas, consider an acquirer
that takes over a foreign company with the aim of reaching costumers abroad. Doing so
could increase the uncertainty faced by the acquirer if the investment is largely irreversible
(e.g. if the assets owned by the target have limited value to other buyers), because it would
increase its willingness to bear negative shocks rather than exiting the market. Alternatively,
if the acquisition facilitates the diversification of revenue streams, it would then result in a
reduction in the uncertainty perceived by the buyer. Since economic theory does not provide
an unequivocal indication about how acquisitions affect the uncertainty faced by acquirers
and the magnitude of this effect, these are ultimately empirical questions which we tackle in
this paper.
We use a matching estimator combined with difference-in-differences to control for the
endogenous self-selection of firms into acquiring other firms as well as for time-invariant un-
observed firm heterogeneity. More specifically, we employ a ‘doubly robust’ estimator which
uses propensity score weighting combined with covariate adjustment to estimate the coun-
terfactual volatility that acquirers would have experienced had they not pursued a takeover.
Our identification strategy differs from the event-study methodology used most frequently
in the aforementioned literature investigating the impact of acquisitions on shareholders’
wealth. We calculate the realized volatility of acquirers as the standard deviation of daily
stock returns within a given quarter and investigate the impact of acquisitions exert on
volatility one to three quarters after a deal’s announcement. We do so to take into ac-
count the the well-documented persistence of the volatility of stock returns (Schwert, 1989;
Andersen et al., 2001), and the fact that the mechanisms through which different types of
acquisitions affect firm-level uncertainty are likely to take some time to realize.
Uncertainty plays a crucial role in shaping firms’ real and financial decisions. For instance,
acquisition failures—or “Deals from Hell” as he refers to them.
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investment projects often entail large sunk costs, which makes them at least partially irre-
versible and creates an option value of waiting. When uncertainty rises, this real option
mechanism causes firms to postpone investment until conditions improve and makes them
less responsive to policy stimuli (see e.g. Leahy and Whited, 1996; Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom,
2009, among others). Higher uncertainty has also been shown to increase the cost of external
finance, risk premia and the likelihood of default (Froot et al., 1993; Adrian and Rosenberg,
2008; Arellano et al., 2019).
Our first key result is that the internationalization margin plays a key role in determining
the impact of acquisitions on the volatility of stock returns of acquirers. More precisely, we
find that this relationship is characterized by a pecking order: domestic acquisitions lead
to a substantial reduction in volatility while cross-border deals produce the opposite effect.
Within the latter group, deals involving the takeover of target firms located in emerging
markets have a large and positive impact on the volatility of the acquirer while cross-border
transactions targeting firms in developed markets do not appear to affect the volatility of
the acquirer.
A second novel result from our analysis is that acquisitions exert a long-lasting im-
pact on firm-level uncertainty. This resonates with the ‘capabilities view’ of acquisitions,
which argues that the success of an acquisition is determined by the way in which acquired
capabilities are integrated into the acquiring firm in the aftermath of a deal—a difficult,
uncertain, and time-consuming process (Haspelagh and Jemison, 1991; Child et al., 2001).
Our findings suggest that the complexities involved in applying and transferring capabilities
to newly acquired targets are strongly influenced by whether firms extend their boundaries
across borders and the level of development of the markets they expand to. This, in turn, is
manifested in large and persistent differentials in the response of stock returns volatility to
different types of acquisitions.
To explore the forces that give rise to the differential response of volatility to acquisitions,
we investigate how these responses are affected by different characteristics of acquisition
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transactions such as deal size, whether the target firm operates in the same industry as
the acquirer or not and the extent of ownership control achieved. Our analysis indicates
that acquirers face greater uncertainty in the process of extending their boundaries across
borders than domestically—particularly when acquisitions involve taking over target firms
in markets that are less developed and more dissimilar to their own. The positive effect
that cross-border acquisitions in emerging markets exert on the volatility of acquirers is
most notable for large deals and those that only deliver minority control of the target. The
former effect is consistent with these transactions being characterized by a higher degree of
irreversibility.
The stronger positive effect we find in minority transactions indicates that there is greater
uncertainty surrounding the successful integration of the acquirer and the target when the
former faces more limitations in shaping this process. In sharp contrast, we find that the neg-
ative impact of domestic acquisitions on volatility arises only in majority transactions. Over-
all, our results do not indicate that the extent of diversification produced by an acquisition,
either across countries or industries, contributes systematically to reduce the uncertainty
faced by acquirers.
Our focus on UK acquirers is interesting to a wide audience for two main reasons. Firstly,
the UK has long been one of the world’s major players in terms of domestic and cross-border
acquisitions—this makes our findings highly relevant for firms based in other main major
financial centers from which a large share of the world’s acquisitions originate. Secondly, our
results have important implications for the UK in the aftermath of the decision to leave the
European Union. Brexit has been a major source of uncertainty for UK businesses (Bloom
et al., 2019). Our results suggest that if UK firms reorient their cross-border acquisitions
(the most important component of foreign direct investment) away from the European Union
towards emerging markets, this could further increase the uncertainty they face.
4
Related Literature
Our paper lies at the intersection of the literature on finance and international economics.
Globalization plays a central role in determining outcomes in the market for corporate con-
trol. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) report substantial differences across a wide range of
characteristics such as deal size, market-to-book ratios and method of payment between do-
mestic and cross-border acquisitions carried out by US acquirers; they also find that domestic
deals systematically elicit higher announcement returns than cross-border ones. Denis et al.
(2002) find that firms that expand across countries—increasing the extent of their global
diversification—see an increase in the discount in value they face relative to a comparable
portfolio of undiversified firms.
The geographic pattern of firms’ expansion also affects the response of stock returns to
acquisitions. Doukas and Travlos (1988) find that abnormal returns of US acquirers are
higher when they expand into new and less developed markets; using data from acquirers
and targets from a large number of countries, Chari et al. (2009) show that acquirers only
achieve positive abnormal returns when they gain majority control of targets located in
emerging markets. Gregory and McCorriston (2005) reach a similar conclusion, showing that
returns for UK acquirers are only positive for cross-border acquisitions undertaken outside
the US and the European Union. We contribute directly to this literature by showing that
globalization and the geographic scope of firms’ acquisitions not only affect the expected
gains of takeovers but also have an important impact on the uncertainty faced by acquirers.
Our paper contributes to a small but growing literature that investigates how differ-
ent margins of globalization affect the volatility of firm-level performance outcomes. Rian˜o
(2011) and Vannoorenberghe (2012) study how exporting affects the volatility of firms’ sales,
and Kurz and Senses (2016) examine the impact of exporting and importing on employment
volatility. In contrast to these papers, our focus on stock returns as the underlying per-
formance dimension of interest allows us to use daily data to estimate volatility. Doing so
allows us to capture its well-document short-term fluctuations which would otherwise be
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smoothed out when volatility is estimated using the type of low-frequency data available in
most manufacturing surveys. Our paper is closely related to Girma et al. (2016), which stud-
ies how changes on the intensive margin of exports and foreign sales carried out by foreign
subsidiaries affect the volatility of stock returns of Japanese firms. We differ from Girma
et al. (2016) in two key respects; first, while they study how relatively smaller changes in
the intensive margin of foreign sales affect volatility, we focus instead on larger changes in
firms’ global engagement along the extensive margin brought about by the acquisition of
new firms. Second, we compare the impact of the domestic acquisitions on volatility to that
produced by cross-border transactions and show that the impact of the latter is crucially
affected by the type of market—developed vs emerging—that a firm expands into.
Lastly, our paper speaks to the body of work in international trade that investigates the
impact of foreign acquisitions on a wide range of outcomes, including total factor productiv-
ity, technology transfer, innovation and wage premia, among others (Girma and Go¨rg, 2007;
Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Guadalupe et al., 2012; Wang and Wang, 2015). This literature
has primarily focused on the effect of acquisitions on target firms (Stiebale and Trax (2011)
and Stiebale (2016) are notable exceptions) in terms of ‘real’ variables. We contribute to
this literature by evaluating how acquisitions affect the uncertainty that financial markets
perceive about the expected future profitability of acquiring firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses potential channels
through which acquisitions can affect firm-level uncertainty. Section 3 describes our data
and provides summary statistics. Section 4 describes our empirical methodology and iden-
tification strategy. Results of our empirical analysis are presented in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Globalization, Acquisitions and Volatility
In this section we discuss different mechanisms through which the announcement of an acqui-
sition deal could affect the uncertainty that investors perceive about the future profitability
of the acquiring firm—as measured by the volatility of its stock returns. As will become ap-
parent shortly, whether or not a takeover deal extends a firm’s boundary across borders plays
a key role in shaping how the volatility of stock returns reacts in response to an acquisition.
A central tenet of the theory of the multinational firm is that foreign-owned firms operate
at a disadvantage compared to local ones in terms of their knowledge of consumer preferences,
business practices and institutions (Caves, 1996). For instance, differences in corporate
culture can make the integration between the acquirer and the target firm’s management
teams more difficult (Child et al., 2001); costlier international monitoring can induce the
local manager of a foreign target to behave opportunistically and to not maximize the value
of the merged firm (Antra`s et al., 2009); differences in accounting practices and disclosure
agreements can dent the effectiveness of due diligence processes, making it harder for bidders
to accurately assess the value of a prospective acquisition (Mantecon, 2009). The more
important these frictions are, the more likely it is that financial markets perceive greater
uncertainty about an acquirer’s future performance when it takes over a foreign rather than
a domestic firm. Furthermore, we would expect this difference to be greater for target firms
based in markets that are more dissimilar from that of the bidder’s—in the context of our
empirical work, when UK firms buy companies in emerging markets.
Alternatively, a firm that acquires a company located in another country or operating
in a different industry than its own could experience a reduction in the volatility of its
stock returns through a diversification effect. Rowland and Tesar (2004) find that adding
multinationals to a portfolio of domestic firms provides diversification benefits for investors
in the U.S., Canada and Germany; Fillat et al. (2015) find that the risk premium of US
multinationals is lower when they have affiliates in countries with business cycles that are less
correlated with the US economy. In this case we would expect deals in which acquirers take
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over firms in industries different to their main line of business and cross-border acquisitions
in emerging markets to lower the volatility of their stock returns. Acquisitions could also
have a negative impact on uncertainty if they expand a firm’s internal capital market. This
could lower external finance dependence and improve the allocation of resources within the
combined firm.
A substantial body of work in finance, however, has identified a robust diversification
discount—diversified firms tend to be less valued than a portfolio of comparable, single-
segment firms—both along the industry and internationalization margins (Lang and Stulz,
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Denis et al., 2002). This literature, in turn, has found that
one of the main reasons why firms remain diversified despite the substantial costs of doing
so, is that managers derive private benefits such as higher compensation, more power within
the merged firm, the greater prestige that accompanies corporate empire-building, and the
ability to diversify their own personal portfolios, to name a few (see e.g. Morck et al., 1990;
Denis et al., 1997). If diversifying deals are more prone to be driven by factors unrelated
to profit maximization, then it is plausible that rather than reducing uncertainty, these
acquisitions could instead lead to greater uncertainty for investors.
Acquisitions can also be understood as real options in the sense that acquirers have
flexibility about when to propose a deal to the target and that they constitute an investment
that is, to a large extent, irreversible (Morellec and Zhdanov, 2005; Hackbarth and Morellec,
2008). Irreversibility, in turn, implies that the price that the bidder pays for the target is a
sunk cost—an expenditure that cannot be fully recovered if the investment were to be undone.
Rian˜o (2011) and Fillat and Garetto (2015) show that when the entry cost of entering a
foreign market—either by exporting or by opening an affiliate abroad—is sunk, firms increase
their willingness to bear operational losses in order to avoid paying the entry cost again in
the future if they decide to leave the market. Since the entry costs involved in servicing
foreign markets are substantially larger than those involved in operating domestically, this
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mechanism implies that exporters and multinationals are more volatile and riskier2 than
domestic firms. The same intuition applies to foreign entry by means acquisitions as well. A
direct implication obtained from this class of models is that the higher the sunk cost is, the
larger the effect we should expect on the volatility of stock returns. We would also expect
a stronger effect of acquisitions on volatility for transactions targeting firms in emerging
markets since the thinness of the market for corporate control in these countries would
exacerbate the irreversibility of these investments.
The extent of control that a bidder achieves over a target firm is crucial in shaping
the functioning of the combined firm, e.g. determining the scope for transfer of technology,
intangible assets and other tacit knowledge such as management practices. The decision to
pursue the partial control of a target following an acquisition entails both benefits and costs
for the acquirer. Mantecon (2009) suggests that partial ownership allows the acquirer to
learn about the profitability of the target at a lower cost than a full acquisition would—an
advantage that is more valuable in situations characterized by high valuation uncertainty.
Alquist et al. (2019) show that, in the context of cross-border acquisitions, keeping the
target’s owners as partners can reduce the acquirer’s costs of operation—particularly in
unfamiliar environments or in places characterized by weaker investor protection. On the
other hand, securing only a minority control of a target can increase the risk of failure in
integrating the management of the acquiring and target firms and limit the ability of the
acquirer to monitor and rein in opportunistic behavior by the target’s management. This, in
turn, weakens the incentive for outside investors to join in co-financing the venture (Antra`s
et al., 2009). Limits to full ownership imposed on foreign investors, which are more prevalent
in emerging markets, provide less protection for the acquirer’s shareholders against the risk
of expropriation relative to domestically-owned firms (Bris and Cabolis, 2008).
In summary, there are several channels through which acquisitions can affect the level
of uncertainty faced by acquirers. The theory, however, does not provide unequivocal pre-
2In the sense of their stock returns covaring more strongly with the economy’s stochastic discount factor.
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dictions about this relationship. We now turn to our empirical analysis to explore to what
extent the different theoretical channels we identify are reflected in our data.
3 Data
Our data comes from two sources: Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum International Mergers
and Acquisitions database and Datastream. SDC reports public and private merger and
acquisition transactions involving at least a 5% stake in the target company. For each
transaction we observe the deal’s value, the share of the target firm’s equity purchased, the
dates of announcement and completion of the deal, and the country and industry of operation
of the acquiring and target firms. Daily stock prices, which we use to construct stock returns
and their volatility, as well as other financial variables used in our estimation are sourced
from Datastream (see the footnote of Table 2 for their definition).
Our sample consists of 1,316 firms listed in London Stock Exchange observed from the first
quarter of 2004 until the third quarter of 2017, which yields 46,021 firm-quarter observations.
We calculate stock returns as the first difference of the logarithm of a firm’s daily stock
price. Following an extensive literature in finance and macroeconomics , we measure firm-
level uncertainty by means of the realized volatility of stock returns—i.e. as the standard
deviation of firms’ daily stock returns within a given quarter.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the number of acquisitions occurring during our
period of analysis. There are a total of 2,085 acquisition deals completed in our data.
Slightly over half of these involve the acquisition of another firm in the UK (i.e. domestic
acquisitions); in approximately three-quarters of the remaining cross-border deals, the target
firm is located in another developed country.3 In terms of the number of deals, the United
States, Germany, Australia, France and Canada are the most important target markets
3We classify any acquisition in which the target firm is not based in an OECD country as an emerging
market cross-border deal; only a very small number of transactions involve firms in smaller developing
countries that would not usually be considered emerging markets—our results are robust to excluding these
transactions from the estimation.
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among developed countries; the largest number of acquisitions in emerging markets take
place in Brazil, South Africa, Russia, India and China respectively. Acquisitions in developed
markets tend to be of higher value, are more likely to achieve control of the target firm and
are also more likely to be diversifying—in the sense that the main industry of operation of
the target firm is different from that of the acquirer. These patterns are closely in line with
the stylized facts documented by Chari et al. (2009) and Antra`s and Yeaple (2014) using a
sample of acquirers from different origin countries (also sourced from SCD) and the Bureau
of Economic Analysis’s Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad respectively.
[Table 1 about here.]
We split the firms in our data in three groups according to their acquisition activities:
firms that never engaged in acquisitions during our period of study (non-acquirers), firms that
have only acquired other firms in the UK (domestic acquirers) and firms that have acquired at
least one firm abroad (cross-border acquirers). Table 2 presents summary statistics about the
characteristics of firms in each of these groups. The overarching message is that firms with
different propensity to participate in the market for corporate control also differ substantially
along a wide range of observable characteristics. Cross-border acquirers have more volatile
stock returns, are significantly larger (in terms of their market capitalization) and have
higher earnings-per-share than both domestic acquirers non-acquirers—the same pattern
that Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) document for U.S. firms. Domestic acquirers are
more similar to non-acquirers in terms of their volatility and earnings-per-share, but are
significantly larger and exhibit the lowest book-to-market ratio among the three groups.
The decision to acquire another company is obviously not random, and is in fact shaped
by observable characteristics of the acquiring firm such as size, profitability and previous
experience with acquisitions, that are also likely to affect the volatility of its stock returns.
Under these circumstances, the volatility of stock returns for non-acquirers does not provide
a good estimate of the counterfactual level of uncertainty that acquiring firms would have
experienced had they not engaged in acquisitions. In the next section we describe the
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econometric strategy we follow to address the endogeneity of firms’ acquisition decision.
[Table 2 about here.]
4 Econometric Strategy
Our objective is to estimate the causal effect of domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the
volatility of stock returns of acquiring firms—i.e. the average treatment effect of acquisitions
on the level of uncertainty experienced by acquirers. This entails comparing the expected
stock return volatility of firms that engaged in different types of acquisitions to the volatility
of returns that these firms would have experienced had they not done so. Thus, the main
empirical challenge we face is to obtain a consistent estimate of the counterfactual outcome
which is, by definition, unobservable.
We employ a matching estimator that utilizes non-acquiring firms that are similar to
domestic and cross-border acquirers across a wide range of observable pre-acquisition char-
acteristics to construct counterfactual outcomes for the two types of treated firms. We
combine this estimator with a difference-in-differences approach that purges the influence
of all observable and unobservable non-random elements of the acquisition decision that are
constant over time. Our main identifying assumption is that firms’ selection into conducting
acquisitions is based upon observable characteristics. Since we use a difference-in-differences
approach, the selection-on-observables assumption implies that, conditional on observables,
the log differences in potential outcomes across treated and control groups are as good as
random. As with any matching estimator, time-varying unobservable factors that influence
both the acquisition decision and the volatility of returns could contaminate our estimates.
We use the ‘doubly robust’ regression approach first proposed by Bang and Robins
(2005)—which integrates propensity score weighing with covariates adjustment—to oper-
ationalize our matching estimator. By combining inverse probability weighting with regres-
sion covariates adjustment, the doubly robust estimator provides two opportunities to adjust
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for selection on observables. Thus, a crucial advantage of this estimator is that it delivers
unbiased inference of causal effects even under model misspecification—as long as either the
conditional mean regression or the propensity score models are correctly specified.
We use a multinomial logit model with three outcomes—no acquisition, domestic acquisi-
tion and cross-border acquisition—to estimate the propensity score. All covariates included
in the estimation of the propensity score are lagged 4 quarters in order to allay concerns of
reverse causality. We then use the estimated predicted probability that firm i would conduct
an acquisition of type j in quarter t (using no acquisitions as the reference group) conditional
on covariates, pP pAit  j|Xit4q, to weight treatment observations of group j by the inverse
of the predicted probability of receiving a given treatment, pP1j . Doing so gives firms with
higher ex-ante probability of engaging in either domestic or cross-border acquisitions less
weight in the conditional mean regression, thereby controlling for selection bias.
Our benchmark estimating equation is:
∆s ln yit s  ln yit s  ln yit  α   A
1
itβ   X
1
i,t4Γ   Fptq   εit, (1)
where i indexes firms and t P t2004q1, . . . , 2017q3u denotes time (quarter-years). Our out-
come variable is the log difference between quarters t  s and t of firm i’s volatility of stock
returns. In order to put our results in context with the extensive literature that examines the
behavior of the level of stock returns, in our first set of results we use mean stock returns as
our dependent variable. Our main variables of interest are subsumed in the vector of acquisi-
tion dummies, Ait, which take the value 1 when firm i announces the acquisition of another
firm—either domestically or abroad (with the latter further decomposed in cross-border ac-
quisitions in developed and emerging markets depending on the specification)—in period t
and 0 otherwise. The vector Xi,t4 comprises a set of pre-treatment control variables (the
same ones used in the estimation of the propensity score) lagged by four quarters and Fptq
denotes an array of quarter and year fixed effects that control for seasonal and aggregate
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factors such as merger waves and macroeconomic shocks that affect the acquisition activities
of firms.
Determinants of Acquisitions
We now discuss the estimates from the multinomial logit model we use to estimate the
propensity score. The choice of explanatory variables is guided by the extensive literature
in finance investigating the acquisition decision of firms.
[Table 3 about here.]
Firms that engage in acquisitions often do so repeatedly over time (Fuller et al., 2002).
Karolyi et al. (2016) report that one in five public acquirers are ‘serial acquirers’—i.e. they
purchase five or more targets within 3 years—accounting for two-thirds of the cumulative
acquisition value around the world. Thus, to control for the high level of persistence of
acquiring activity, we include dummies for past domestic and cross-border acquisitions; these
take the value 1 if a firm has successfully acquired at least one target at home or abroad
respectively in the previous year and 0 otherwise. We include firms’ market capitalization to
control for the fact that larger firms are more able to bear the large search and transaction
costs involved in acquisitions (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Moeller et al., 2004).
Firms’ market valuation and profitability are captured by Market-to-Book value and
earnings-per-share respectively. In the neoclassical model with efficient capital markets of
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), firms are more likely to use acquisitions to expand when
their profitability and market valuation are high. A positive correlation between market
valuation and acquisitions also arises in models in which rational managers use acquisitions
to exploit arbitrage opportunities that arise when target firms are undervalued by the market
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).
As we discussed in Section 2, acquiring another company involves the exercise of a real
option. Inasmuch as this decision is at least partially irreversible, higher volatility provides
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an incentive to delay the investment as the option value of waiting increases (Leahy and
Whited, 1996; Bloom et al., 2007; Grullon et al., 2012). Thus, we include both the volatility
of stock returns of the acquirer to account for this effect. Lastly, Andrade et al. (2001)
show that acquisitions tend to occur in response to unexpected industry-level shocks such
as technological breakthroughs and deregulation; we therefore include the mean volatility of
stock returns within 3-digit industries to proxy for the type of market upheaval that makes
waves of acquisitions more likely to occur.
Table 3 reports marginal effects for our estimated model for the propensity score. Prior
experience with acquisitions, both domestically and across borders, is the most important
factor explaining subsequent acquisitions—a pattern that has also been documented for UK
and French acquirers by Stiebale and Trax (2011). Size is also a strong predictor of both types
of acquisitions, but particularly so for cross-border deals, consistent with the fact that fixed
costs for these transactions are substantially larger than for domestic deals. It is interesting
to note that while neither the firm- nor industry-level volatility of stock returns have a
significant impact on cross-border acquisitions, they tend to inhibit domestic acquisitions.
This could be due to the fact that acquisition activity increases when market valuation is
high, as Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) document, and this in turn is negatively
correlated with stock market volatility (Bloom, 2014).
[Table 4 about here.]
It is worth noting that the role of propensity score estimation in treatment effects models
with observational data is not to provide a causal explanation of the mechanisms determining
the incidence of treatment—to engage in domestic or cross-border acquisitions in our case—
but instead to achieve a ‘balancing score’ in the sense of weighting the observations to
eliminate biases in estimated treatment effects due to differences in the distribution of the
baseline covariates. To this end, Table 4 reports standardized differences for the means as
well as variance ratios for the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity score. The
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results reveal substantial differences between both types of acquirers and non-acquirers in
the raw data, thus providing clear evidence of selection into treatment. Once we weight non-
treated observations, however, the standardized differences are substantially reduced and
variance ratios are closer to one; this indicates that the matching procedure is able to reduce
a substantial amount of bias resulting from differences in the observed covariates.4 Putting it
differently, our matching procedure is successful in finding appropriate non-acquiring firms—
in terms of being very similar in their pre-treatment observable characteristics to treated
firms—to compare with both types of acquirers.
5 Results
In this section we present our matching difference-in-differences estimates of the average
treatment effect of acquisitions on the volatility of stock returns of acquiring firms.
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of acquisitions on mean stock returns.
This enables us to contrast our results with the extensive body of work examining whether
acquisitions create value for shareholders by estimating the reaction of abnormal stock re-
turns to the announcement of a deal (see e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Andrade et al.,
2001; Moeller et al., 2004, and many others). These results are reported in Panel A in Table
5. We find a positive, albeit small, impact of the announcement of domestic acquisitions on
the mean stock returns of acquirers relative to what they would have experienced had they
not engaged in acquisitions across the 3 quarters following the announcement of a takeover.
Cross-border acquisitions produce a stronger and statistically significant increase on bidders’
mean returns one quarter after the announcement of the acquisition, but this difference turns
insignificant afterwards. These results are in line with the consensus in the literature, which
finds that acquisitions do not have a significant effect on the returns of acquirers—neither
in the short nor in long-run.
4The empirical literature considers standardized differences below 10% and variance ratios between 0.5
and 2 after matching to indicate that covariate balancing has been achieved (see Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008).
16
We now turn our attention to the main focus of our analysis—i.e. the effect that ac-
quisitions have on firm-level uncertainty. Our baseline results are presented in Panel B of
Table 5. Our first result is that domestic acquisitions have a strong and negative impact
on the volatility of stock returns of bidding firms. Our point estimates indicate that in the
three quarters following the announcement of the successful acquisition of a firm based in
the same country as the acquirer, the volatility of stock returns of acquirers falls, on average,
between 6.3% to 9.5% relative what it would have been had they not engaged in domestic
acquisitions.
In contrast to domestic deals, we find that the announcement of cross-border takeovers
has a positive effect on volatility. While the overall effect is insignificant, this result masks
significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect depending on the location of the target firm.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 report the effect of cross-border acquisitions according to the
location of the target firm in either a developed or emerging market. These results show that
while cross-border deals involving target firms in other developed markets do not engender
any discernible response on the volatility of acquirers, taking over firms in emerging markets
exerts a large and positive effect on the volatility of stock returns of buyers. More precisely,
emerging market acquisitions increase the volatility of acquiring firms by 12%. Notably, this
effect remains strong in three quarters following the acquisition announcement.
Thus, our benchmark results show that the impact that acquisitions have on markets’
perceptions about of the uncertainty faced by acquirers follow a pecking order determined
by the geographic scope of transactions. Successfully acquiring a firm within the same
country leads to a reduction in uncertainty as proxied by the realized volatility of its stock
returns. The direction of the effect changes when firms extend their boundaries across
national borders, becoming large and positive when acquisition involve firms located in
emerging rather than developed markets.
While abnormal returns are only significant a few days after the announcement of a
takeover deal, we find that acquisitions exert a long-lasting effect on the volatility of stock
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returns of acquirers. This finding suggests that the success of an acquisition in creating value
for shareholders depend crucially on the slow and uncertain process of integration that takes
place between the acquirer and the target (Haspelagh and Jemison, 1991). Accordingly, the
volatility of stock returns of acquirers is strongly influenced by acquisitions for a long time
after the deal’s announcement.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
We now move to explore the forces that give rise to this ranking. The literature in-
vestigating the reaction of abnormal returns to acquisitions has found that this response
is crucially mediated by features such as deal size, the country of operation of the target
firm, and whether the acquisition achieved majority control (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller and
Schlingemann, 2005; Chari et al., 2009). In an analogous way, we investigate whether the
treatment effect of acquisitions on the volatility of acquirers varies systematically accord-
ing to characteristics of the transaction. To do so, we add interaction terms between each
treatment indicator and different transaction characteristics to the estimating equation (1).
[Table 7 about here.]
We have established that the geographic scope of acquisitions is crucial in determining
the impact they have on the volatility of stock returns of acquiring firms. We first investi-
gate whether industrial diversification also plays a role in shaping this relationship. As we
discussed in Section 2, an acquirer’s expansion to other industries could, in theory, have an
ambiguous impact on the uncertainty of its stock returns. On the one hand, a diversifica-
tion effect could result in lower uncertainty; on the other hand, if the acquirer’s expansion
to other industries leads to over-investment, resource diversion towards under-performing
business segments and agency problems between managers and shareholders, then we would
expect uncertainty to increase in the aftermath of the acquisition’s announcement.
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We classify acquisitions as horizontal—in the sense that the buyer expands its capacity
in the same line of business it currently operates—when the acquirer and target firms’ 3-
digit industry is the same; otherwise, we refer to acquisitions as being diversifying. The
results presented in Table 7 show that horizontal acquisitions exert a stronger impact on the
volatility of bidders’ stock returns—particularly, for cross-border acquisitions in emerging
markets. This type of acquisition increases the volatility of the acquirer’s stock returns by
15-17%. This finding is consistent with the results of Girma et al. (2016), who show that
the volatility of stock returns of Japanese firms increases when their intensity of horizontal
FDI activity—measured as the share of sales accounted for by foreign affiliates—rises.
While diversifying domestic acquisitions still lead to a reduction in the volatility of ac-
quirers, the magnitude of this effect is smaller than for horizontal acquisitions. On the one
hand, this finding together with the fact that cross-border acquisitions in emerging markets
have the largest positive impact on uncertainty, suggest that the diversification channel does
not play an important role in shaping the response of volatility to acquisitions. On the
other hand, the weaker results for diversifying acquisitions might reflect the fact that this
group included both both vertical and conglomerate deals which might have very different
impact on acquirers’ performance (Herger and McCorriston, 2016). While acquisitions that
ease connections between firms in different parts of supply chains can reduce uncertainty by
increasing operational flexibility, conglomerate acquisitions have been show to increase re-
source misallocation within firms and can therefore lead to higher volatility for acquirers. In
contrast to most sample splits we consider, we find that horizontal cross-border acquisitions
in developed markets have a significant negative effect on volatility of a similar magnitude
to that produced by domestic transactions.
[Table 8 about here.]
We now turn to examine how deal size shapes the impact of acquisitions on the volatility
of acquirers. To this end, we define large acquisitions as those for which the value paid by
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the bidder is above above the median deal size for each type of acquisition (domestic, cross-
border developed and cross-border emerging). The results in Table 8 show that only large
acquisitions affect the volatility of acquirers’ stock returns. Since smaller acquisitions are less
likely to have an impact on the expected future profitability of acquirers, it is not surprising
that they do not have a significant effect on firm-level uncertainty either. Conditional on
the value of the acquisition being sufficiently high, we see that the response of acquirers’
volatility to acquisitions follows the same ranking we identified in our benchmark result.
Acquiring firms based in emerging markets increases the volatility of stock returns between
18% and 27% in the three quarters following the announcement of a deal, whereas buying
another firm in the UK is instead associated with a reduction in uncertainty between 8%
to 11%. Foreign acquisitions in other developed countries, once again, have no significant
impact on firm-level uncertainty regardless of their size.
These results are consistent with acquisitions in emerging markets being characterized
by a higher degree of irreversibility than transactions where target firms are located in the
UK and other developed countries. This could be a result of the market for corporate
control in emerging markets being less liquid, thereby making it harder for buyers to unwind
unsuccessful deals in which synergies, or any other benefits that bidders expect to obtain
from the acquisition, fail to materialize. If the extent to which the acquisition price paid
by a bidder is sunk is more important when buying target firms in emerging markets, then
it follows that acquisitions would exert a positive effect on firm-level volatility in these
transactions. The reason is that the higher the sunk cost of acquiring a target firm, the
more reluctant an acquirer is to exit in response to negative shocks, which increases the
uncertainty faced by the firm’s investors. The large differential effect that acquisitions exert
on uncertainty according to the country of operation of the target is consistent with previous
evidence showing that entry into foreign markets by other means (exports and greenfield FDI)
makes firms both more volatile and riskier (Rian˜o, 2011; Fillat and Garetto, 2015).
[Table 9 about here.]
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In our last cut of the data we examine how the impact of acquisitions on firm-level
uncertainty is shaped by the extent of control achieved by acquisitions; namely, we divide
each class of transactions according to whether the acquisition leaves the acquirer with at
least more than half of the target’s equity (majority) or not (minority). The results reported
in Table 9 show that the degree of control achieved by a takeover is a key factor driving
the relationship between acquisitions and firm-level uncertainty. The positive impact that
cross-border acquisitions carried out in emerging markets exert on the volatility of stock
returns of acquirers is primarily accounted for by minority acquisitions. Our findings suggest
that financial markets perceive that partial ownership hampers the ability of acquirers to
extend the benefits associated with better institutional and corporate governance practices
to targets based in emerging markets, in line with the results of Chari et al. (2009). In
contrast, the negative effect we have found following domestic acquisitions is only realized
when the acquirer achieves majority control of the target. This result suggests that the
reduction in uncertainty following the acquisition of a domestic target occurs in situations
in which the acquirer can exert greater control in shaping the process of integration with the
target.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides the first evaluation of the causal effect of domestic and cross-border
acquisitions on the uncertainty faced by acquiring firms using data from publicly-listed firms
in the UK over the period 2004-2017. We utilize a matching estimator combined with
differences-in-differences to address the endogenous selection of firms into acquisitions and
investigate the channels through which acquisitions shape the volatility of stock returns of
acquirers.
We find that the geographic scope of acquisitions gives rise to a pecking order in terms
of their impact on the volatility of acquirers. More precisely, we find that the volatility
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of stock returns of acquirers falls after the completion of domestic acquisitions; it is not
affected by cross-border takeovers involving firms located in other developed markets and
increases substantially when target firms are based in emerging markets. Crucially, we
find that acquisitions exert a large and long-lasting effect on the level of uncertainty faced
by acquirers is not only large but also long-lasting. This result stands in sharp contrast
to the mostly insignificant and short-lived impact on the level of abnormal stock returns
documented in the extensive body of work that investigates whether acquisitions create or
destroy value.
Our results suggest that acquisitions affect uncertainty because they change firms’ expo-
sure to shocks—as they operate in new markets or new industries—and also because they
are large and risky investments whose returns take time to materialize. Our finding that
cross-border acquisitions of targets in emerging markets produce a large and positive impact
on the volatility of acquirers is consistent with these investments being characterized by a
higher degree of irreversibility than deals involving firms at home or in developed markets.
We do not find evidence that international or industrial diversification reduces the volatility
of acquirers. We also find that the extent of control achieved through an acquisition is a key
determinant of the impact that takeovers have on uncertainty. The positive effect we find in
emerging market acquisitions is strongly driven by minority-control deals while the negative
effect of domestic deals is accounted for by majority transactions.
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Table 1: Deal Characteristics—by Target Country
Domestic Cross-Border
Developed Emerging
Number of deals 1,166 672 247
Median transaction size ($M) 13.00 33.50 22.00
Majority (%) 81.30 85.27 71.66
Diversifying acquisition (%) 50.00 50.30 39.28
Domestic acquisitions are those in which the target firm is based in the UK;
developed cross-border deals are those in which the target firm is located in
an OECD country. Transaction size is denominated in millions of US dollars.
Majority indicates the percentage of deals in which the acquiring firm holds
50% or more of the target firm’s equity following the acquisition and did not
previously have control. Diversifying acquisitions are those in which the target
firm’s three-digit SIC industry code is different from that of the acquiring firm.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics—by Acquiring Firm Status
Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max
Non-Acquirers
(log) volatility 34,937 -1.36 0.76 -6.44 2.94
Industry volatility 35,457 0.33 0.13 0.00 2.26
Stock returns 34,315 -0.01 0.28 -5.16 3.16
(log) Market value 35,201 4.12 2.50 -4.61 11.91
Market-to-Book ratio 34,983 2.72 4.81 -13.91 34.05
Cash flow per share 33,220 0.25 0.82 -2.76 4.93
Domestic Acquirers
(log) volatility 6,769 -1.38 0.76 -5.48 1.50
Industry volatility 6,847 0.32 0.15 0.00 2.20
Stock returns 6,610 -0.02 0.28 -4.09 2.21
(log) Market value 6,785 4.17 2.29 -2.53 9.40
Market-to-Book ratio 6,739 3.13 6.53 -13.91 34.05
Cash flow per share 6,348 0.22 0.75 -2.76 4.93
Cross-Border Acquirers
(log) volatility 11,515 -1.31 0.68 -5.16 2.01
Industry volatility 11,581 0.35 0.18 0.00 3.89
Stock returns 11,254 -0.01 0.29 -3.70 3.50
(log) Market value 11,508 5.03 2.58 -3.91 11.63
Market-to-Book ratio 11,487 2.74 4.94 -13.91 34.05
Cash flow per share 10,892 0.28 0.83 -2.76 4.93
Non-acquirers are firms that never engage in any acquisition throughout our
period of study; domestic acquirers are firms that acquire at least one firm
in the UK but never acquire a firm abroad; cross-border acquirers are firms
that have, at least once, acquired another firm abroad. Volatility is measured
as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given quarter. Industry
volatility is the value-weighted average of firm-level volatility within a given
3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) industry. Market value is the
sum of a firm’s share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in
issue. Market-to-Book value is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s equity
divided by its book value (the value of the firm’s capital stock in its balance
sheet). Earnings per share is defined as cash flow (funds from operations) per
share outstanding.
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Table 3: Determinants of Acquisitions
Type of Acquisition
Cross-Border Domestic
(1) (2)
Past cross-border acquisitions 0.1098*** 0.0486***
(0.010) (0.009)
Past domestic acquisitions 0.0410*** 0.1427***
(0.007) (0.011)
Market value 0.0047*** 0.0009***
(0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-Book value -0.0002* -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Earnings-per-share -0.0009 -0.0018*
(0.001) (0.001)
Volatility 0.0018 -0.0055***
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry volatility -0.0003 -0.0083***
(0.002) (0.002)
Stock returns 0.0012 0.0044
(0.003) (0.003)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 46,021
Time period 2004q1-2017q3
Entries on the table are marginal effects evaluated at the mean obtained from
estimating a multinomial logit model with three outcomes: no acquisition,
domestic and cross-border acquisition. All covariates are lagged by 4 quarters.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant
at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Effect of Acquisitions on Stock Returns and their Volatility
Outcome: Quarter: Acquisitions
ln yt s  ln yt Domestic Cross-Border
s (1) (2)
Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
Panel A: Mean stock returns
+1 0.015 (0.010) 0.035** (0.016)
+2 0.019** (0.010) 0.006 (0.013)
+3 0.004 (0.011) -0.018 (0.023)
Panel B: Volatility of stock returns
+1 -0.100*** (0.022) 0.030 (0.029)
+2 -0.065*** (0.022) 0.033 (0.028)
+3 -0.080*** (0.026) 0.029 (0.030)
Standard errors in parenthesis ***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant
at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
Table 6: Effect of Acquisitions on the Volatility of Stock Returns by Target Market
Outcome: Quarter: Acquisitions
ln yt s  ln yt Domestic Cross-Border
s Developed Emerging
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility +1 -0.100*** -0.009 0.119***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.047)
+2 -0.065*** -0.006 0.121***
(0.022) (0.035) (0.048)
+3 -0.080*** -0.010 0.116***
(0.026) (0.038) (0.047)
Standard errors in parenthesis ***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant
at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Effect of Acquisitions on the Volatility of Stock Returns: Horizontal and Diversifying
Acquisitions
Acquisition Quarter
+1 +2 +3
Domestic
Horizontal -0.126*** -0.060** -0.114***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.040)
Diversifying -0.074** -0.069** -0.045
(0.029) (0.031) (0.034)
Cross-Border
Developed
Horizontal -0.095*** -0.017 -0.001
(0.045) (0.038) (0.047)
Diversifying 0.090 0.007 -0.021
(0.063) (0.059) (0.059)
Emerging
Horizontal 0.139** 0.159** 0.139**
(0.058) (0.065) (0.062)
Diversifying 0.093 0.070 0.085
(0.077) (0.071) (0.072)
Entries in the table denote the impact of each acquisition type on the change
in the volatility of stock returns of acquiring firms between quarters t  s and
t for s  1, 2, 3. Standard errors in parenthesis ***, significant at the 1%
level; **, significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level. Horizontal
acquisitions are those in which the 3-digit SIC industry of the acquirer and
target firms are the same; otherwise acquisitions are classified as diversifying.
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Table 8: Effect of Acquisitions on the Volatility of Stock Returns by Deal Size
Acquisition Quarter
Type +1 +2 +3
Domestic
Low -0.077*** -0.041 -0.054
(0.030) (0.026) (0.035)
High -0.116*** -0.081** -0.097***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.037)
Cross-Border
Developed
Low -0.018 -0.015 -0.054
(0.044) (0.036) (0.044)
High -0.003 -0.005 0.016
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052)
Emerging
Low 0.042 -0.056 -0.021
(0.048) (0.057) (0.060)
High 0.169** 0.239*** 0.211***
(0.069) (0.064) (0.065)
Entries in the table denote the impact of each acquisition type on the change
in the volatility of stock returns between quarters t   s and t for s  1, 2, 3.
Standard errors in parenthesis ***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant
at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level. Low size means that the
value of the acquisition in a given category is below the median value; high
indicates that the value of the transaction is greater than the median in the
corresponding category.
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Table 9: Effect of Acquisitions on the Volatility of Stock Returns: By Degree of Control
Acquisition Quarter
+1 +2 +3
Domestic
Majority -0.121*** -0.094*** -0.112***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031)
Minority -0.020 0.050 0.055
(0.052) (0.045) (0.052)
Cross-Border
Developed
Majority 0.005 -0.023 -0.062
(0.045) (0.042) (0.042)
Minority -0.055 0.054 0.169**
(0.051) (0.066) (0.081)
Emerging
Majority 0.071 0.107* 0.092*
(0.057) (0.061) (0.055)
Minority 0.251*** 0.179*** 0.222***
(0.071) (0.054) (0.085)
Entries in the table denote the impact of each acquisition type on the change
in the volatility of stock returns of acquiring firms between quarters t  s and
t for s  1, 2, 3. Standard errors in parenthesis ***, significant at the 1%
level; **, significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level. Majority
indicates that the acquirer achieves more than 50% of the target’s equity after
acquisition; an acquisition is deemed a minority one otherwise.
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